Appendix for online publication

A Additional design details

A.1 Was NUSAF politically targeted?

As discussed in Section 2.2, we see little correlation between NUSAF funding and the percentage of votes cast for the ruling NRM party in the previous election at the subcounty level.

Figure 1 presents the NUSAF funding per capita (in Ugandan Shillings) for each of the districts in northern Uganda and the percent of the vote going to the NRM.[4] For any level of support, the majority of districts are in the same range, approximately 10,000 USH to 30,000 USH of funding per person. The one exception is Kitgum district, where funding per capita was very high. As this was the most conflict affected area, and NUSAF was on paper a post-conflict development project, it is likely that funding was purposefully targeted to this area for this mission. However, it is also the district with the lowest support of the NRM, and so could have been subject to manipulation by the central government. In either case, due to funding issues described in the main paper, Kitgum is not part of our sample here.

Manipulation of funding destination by the central government could also have been achieved at the subcounty level, though this would have been a harder level to target due to the complexity of the budgeting process in Uganda and the large number of subcounties present. Table A.1 presents the results of a test for the correlation between the percent of votes for the NRM and the natural log

[4]The data on NUSAF funding comes from administrative records that include all NUSAF projects funded from 2004 to July 2007, one year before the disbursement to the YOP sample and about a year after the most recent national election. Data on election returns come from

Figure A.1: NUSAF Funding and NRM voter share



Notes: This figure presents a scatterplot of NRM voter share in 2006 and the log of total NUSAF funding per capita by the subcounty level.

of the funds per capita in each of the subcounties. The first column shows there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between percent of votes and funding. However, this result is once again heavily skewed by data from Kitgum district. In the second column we include district dummies. The results are now much smaller and not significant.

A.2 Two-stage surveys and response rates

Both endline surveys (2010 and 2012) were rolled out in two phases In Phase 1, we attempted to interview all 2,677 people in their last known location. In 2010, 37% were not found in their last know location, rising to 39% in 2012, and so they became eligible for tracking in Phase 2. In Phase 2, we selected a random sample of the unfound—53% in 2010 and 38.5% in 2012—stratifying by district and by the proportion unfound in the group for in-depth tracking. For this subset of unfound groups, we made three attempts to find them in their new locations and found 75% of them in 2010 and 59% in 2012. In the analysis, groups are weighted to account for this two-stage process. Those found in Phase 1 receive unit weight, those selected for Phase 2 tracking are weighted by the inverse of their selection probability, while those not selected for Phase 2 tracking are dropped. We have no reports of survey refusal, and no reward was offered for survey completion. See table A.2 for a more detailed presentation of effective response rates.

A.3 Survey experiment

To manipulate participant ideas about the implementation of the program, we conducted a survey experiment during the four-year endline. The goal of the survey experiment was to manipulate respondents' ideas about who was behind the implementation of the program (World Bank versus the government) and how participants were selected (randomly selected or nominated by the LC V). Individuals were randomized into one of five groups and in each group the introductory script

of the survey varied along these two dimensions.

1. WORLD BANK, RANDOM. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally made possible by the action of the World Bank and that the groups were selected randomly to receive funding.

2. WORLD BANK, LC V. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally made possible by the action of the World Bank, but groups were selected by the NUSAF district technical officer (NDTO) under the supervision of the LC V Chairperson.

3. GOVERNMENT, RANDOM. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally made possible by the action of the government and that the groups were selected randomly to receive funding.

4. GOVERNMENT, LC V. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally made possible by the action of the government, but groups were selected by the NDTO under the supervision of the LC V Chairperson.

5. NEUTRAL. None of the above information was presented.

Table A.3 displays the results of our survey experiment. We regress program attribution on an indicator for completing a survey where the introduction said the Government/World Bank was behind the program, including covariates and block fixed effects. We do the same for indicators for the randomization prompt. The results show that the experiment was not successful: individuals who were told the government was behind the program were 5 percentage points more likely to believe the World Bank funded the program. Similarly, individuals who were told selection was not random were 2 percentage points less likely to believe selection was not random.

B Additional analysis

B.1 Baseline balance

Table B.1 displays the results of a regression of treatment on each baseline covariate, controlling for district fixed effects and clustering standard errors by group.

B.2 Correlates of attrition

Table B.2 examines baseline correlates of attrition. We regress an indicator for attrition on all baseline covariates including district fixed effects. Those who are younger, more risk averse or work as casual laborers are more likely to attrit. Since attrition is higher among the young and initially poorer, the average impact of treatment is predicted to be higher. At the same time, the more literate are more likely to be unfound and so this could depress their predicted returns from a grant.

B.3 Sensitivity of baseline balance to baseline non-response

Table B.3 looks at the sensitivity of randomization balance to alternate values for the missing control groups. The table examines four baseline covariates displaying randomization imbalance at baseline: durable assets, prior vocational training, ability to obtain a 100,000 UGX loan, and savings in the past 6 months. All covariates are standardized and missing data in the treatment group are imputed to the mean, or zero. However, missing control group data are imputed to the mean (zero) plus 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, or 0.25 SD of the covariate, thus gradually increasing the values of the covariates in the control group towards balance. In general, imputed values of 0.10 to 0.20 SD are sufficient to bring the regression differences to zero.

B.4 Robustness

We perform two sets of additional treatment analyses. First, as shown in Table B.5, our results are robust to alternative regression specifications. Column 1 displays coefficients from our preferred specification in the paper. In columns 2 to 5, we test four alternate specifications. First, we drop all controls and only include randomization block fixed effects. In the second specification, we add only demographic covariates. Next, we add all human and physical capital controls. The last specification shows group-level effects (the unit of randomization).

Second, we check that our results are robust to alternative attrition scenarios. In Table B.6, we calculate lower and upper bounds for the coefficients of our three main dependent variables: Index of NRM/Presidential support, index of opposition support, and index of general election political action. Following Karlan et al. 2015, we calculate lower bounds (Panel A) by imputing relatively high values to missing observations in the control group (control group mean plus 0.025, 0.05, 0.10 or 0.50 SD of the found control distribution), and relatively low values to missing observations in the treatment group (treatment group mean minus 0.025, 0.05, 0.10 or 0.50 SD of the found treatment distribution). The procedure is reversed to calculate upper bounds (Panel B): we impute relatively low (high) values to missing observations in the control (treatment) group. We also compute the lowest (and highest) bound (column 6) following Manski 1990, by imputing the maximum (minimum) value for unfound control members and the minimum (maximum) for unfound treated.

What this table shows is that the impacts of treatment on opposition support would be spurious if the unfound members of the control group are more likely to be government supporters than found members of the control group.

We have no theoretical reason to believe that attrition is correlated with government support, but obviously this is unobserved. As seen in Appendix B.2, at baseline the unfound tended to be younger, poorer, less literate farmers from larger communities. Our intent-to-treat estimates control for these observable correlates of attrition, reducing the risk of bias. Table B.7 also compares our main specification with one where we use inverse propensity score weights for the propensity to go unfound based on all covariates, using the leave-one-out method to estimate weights for each individual in the sample. The results are very similar to our main specification, suggesting that attrition is not driving our results.

B.5 Treatment effects by age

In table B.8, we analyze treatment effects by age to see if the effect is driven by first-time voters. At baseline we could not collect data on whether individuals previously voted and who they voted for, because of restrictions from the government partner and research funder (the World Bank). We do, however, have their age at baseline, which allows us to separate the sample by those who were old enough to vote in the previous election versus those who were not.

The figure shows that potential first time voters (individuals who were under 18 in 2005/20 or under in 2008) see no rise in opposition support. The effects are concentrated among those who were eligible to vote in the previous election.

The lack of impact on young people offers some evidence that the effect we observe is more about preferences. The impacts are coming from individuals who have more experience voting These are not novices with an underdeveloped set of values. They are also more likely to know the consequences of voting. However, this is speculative so we take this result with caution.

B.6 Heterogeneity by fair and random selection

In Table B.9, we display treatment effects by individual's perceptions of the selection process. Among those who thought program selection was fair, opposition support rose by 0.13 standard deviations, compared to 0.121 standard deviations among those who perceived selection as unfair. Among those who thought program selection was random, opposition support rose 0.169 standard deviations, compared to 0.123 standard deviations among those who perceived selection as non-random

B.7 Mediation analysis

In Table B.10 we conduct mediation analysis. In columns 1 and 2, we display treatment effects on all mediators displayed in section 4.2. In columns 3 and 4, we regress opposition support on treatment and each mediator, and display the coefficient and standard error from each mediator. In columns 5 and 6, we regress opposition support on treatment. In column 7, we display the percent of the effect on opposition support mediated by each of variable listed. This is calculated by multiplying the coefficients in column 1 by the coefficients in column 3, divided by the coefficients of column 5. We see that our income index mediates a quarter of the total effect on opposition support, which is large compared to other mediation analyses. The second largest factor is migration, which mediates only 10 percent of the effect we see. All other mediators explain only 5% of the effect we see on opposition support.

B.8 Other outcomes

Table B.11 displays ITT effects on minor outcomes we collected that did not make it into the main paper.

Table A.1: Correlation between voter share and NUSAF funding

	Outcome: 2006 NRM voter share			
	No district fixed effects		District fixed effects	
	Correlation	p-value	Correlation	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log of NUSAF funding per capita	-0.660	<0.01	-0.120	0.78
Observations	313		313	
R^2	0.04		0.27	

Notes: This table displays the results of a regression of 2006 NRM voter share on the log of NUSAF funding per capita on the subcounty level. We exclude district fixed effects in columns (1) and (2) and include them in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are heteroskedastic-robust.

Table A.2: Survey response rates

Survey	Selection and tracking, by survey phase					Effective response rates				
	Total sought	Found, phase1	Select, phase 2	Found, phase 2	Final # of observations	All	Control	Treatment	Difference (percentage points)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2008 baseline	2,677	97.0%	-	-	2,598	97.0%	94.4%	99.8%	5.3	<0.001
2010 endline	2,677	63.4%	53.0%	74.7%	2,005	85.4%	85.6%	85.3%	-0.8	0.717
2012 endline	2,677	61.0%	38.5%	58.6%	1,868	82.1%	79.1%	85.5%	7.1	0.004

Notes: Column (1) reports the full study sample sought in each round–in general, five people per group over 535 groups, save for one groups where baseline data on seven individuals was accidentally collected. Column (2) reports the percentage of these found in a first survey phase, where each respondent was sought at least once in the town they lived at baseline. Each endline had a second survey phase that tracked a random sample of migrants and other unfound individuals, and Column (3) reports average percentage randomly selected. This percentage varied exogenously by stratum according to the proportion missing and expense of tracking in that district. Column (4) reports the percentage of those sought in phase two successfully surveyed. Column (5) reports the final number of observations by survey round. Columns (6)-(9) report the corresponding response rates overall, by treatment status, and the treatment-control difference (calculated via regression, controlling for baseline district). Columns (6)-(9) are weighted by the inverse probability of selection in phase two of the survey (which varies by strata, with weights ranging from 1 to 4), and are referred to as "effective" response rates. Unfound respondents randomly dropped in phase two receive zero weight. Column (10) reports p-value on the difference term, using robust standard errors clustered at the group level.

Table A.3: Survey experiment results

	First stage attribution			First stage selection	
	Government	World Bank		Random	Not random
	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)
Attribute program to:			Believes selection was		
Government	-0.03	-0.04	Random	0.02	0.02
	[.031]	[.030]		[.017]	[.018]
World Bank	0.05	0.04	Not random	-0.02	-0.02
	[.029]*	[.028]		[.017]	[.018]

Notes: This table displays ITT results from our survey experiment. In column (1), we regress program attribution on an indicator for completing a survey where the introduction said the government was behind the program plus covariates and block fixed effects. In column (2), we include an indicator for completing a survey that said the World Bank was behind the program. In column (3), we regress believe in selection process on an indicator for completing a survey where the introduction said selection was random plus covariates and block fixed effects. In column (4), we include an indicator for completing a survey that said selection was not random.

Table B.1: Baseline balance

	Control		Control - Treat	
	Mean	SD	Diff	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Grant amount applied for, USD	7,497.44	2,219.95	143.82	0.29
Applicant group size	22.53	6.83	0.03	0.96
Grant amount per member, USD	363.05	159.40	14.09	0.25
Group existed before application	0.45	0.50	0.03	0.42
Group age, in years	3.80	2.00	-0.05	0.80
Within-group heterogeneity (z-score)	-0.03	0.92	-0.03	0.75
Quality of group dynamic (z-score)	-0.02	1.02	0.05	0.53
Distance to educational facilities (km)	6.84	6.50	0.48	0.35
Individual unfound at baseline	0.06	0.23	-0.05	0.00
Age at baseline	24.75	5.22	0.17	0.55
Female	0.35	0.48	-0.02	0.38
Large town or urban area	0.23	0.42	-0.02	0.61
Risk aversion index (z-score)	-0.02	1.00	-0.01	0.75
Any leadership position in group	0.28	0.45	-0.00	0.88
Group chair or vice-chair	0.11	0.31	0.01	0.33
Weekly employment, hours	10.70	15.82	0.57	0.48
All non-agricultural work	5.99	12.47	-0.45	0.44
Casual labor, low skill	1.03	5.19	-0.11	0.63
Petty business, low skill	2.24	6.95	0.21	0.52
Skilled trades	1.78	8.41	-0.33	0.40
High-skill wage labor	0.04	0.58	0.08	0.02
Other non-agricultural work	0.91	4.76	-0.29	0.10
All agricultural work	4.66	10.08	1.04	0.04
Weekly household chores, hours	8.96	17.59	0.30	0.73
Zero employment hours in past month	0.48	0.50	-0.04	0.18
Main occupation is non-agricultural	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.92
Engaged in a skilled trade	0.08	0.27	0.00	0.81
Currently in school	0.04	0.21	-0.01	0.45
Highest grade reached at school	7.95	2.92	-0.07	0.62
Able to read and write minimally	0.75	0.43	-0.03	0.17
Received prior vocational training	0.07	0.26	0.02	0.07
Digit recall test score	4.16	2.00	-0.04	0.64
Index of physical disability	8.68	2.52	-0.14	0.29
Wealth Index	-0.16	0.96	0.07	0.12
Savings in past 6 mo. (000s 2008 UGX)	19.25	98.19	10.89	0.02
Monthly gross cash earnings (000s 2008 UGX)	62.19	129.04	6.89	0.30
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($58) loan	0.33	0.47	0.05	0.01
Can obtain 1,000,000 UGX ($580) loan	0.10	0.30	0.01	0.46

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Table 10: Baseline balance (continued)

	Control		Control - Treat	
	Mean	SD	Diff	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Registered to vote in 2006	0.92	0.27	-0.01	0.57
Voted in 2006 presidential election	0.73	0.45	0.03	0.21
Voted in 2005 referendum	0.60	0.49	0.01	0.67
Voted in 2005 district election	0.68	0.47	0.01	0.59
Member of a political party	0.11	0.31	0.02	0.06
Participated in election of community leaders in past year	0.45	0.50	0.01	0.72
Attended community meetings in past month	0.47	0.50	-0.00	0.83
Is a community mobilizer	0.45	0.50	-0.01	0.50
Currently a community leader	0.26	0.44	0.01	0.61
Currently on a community committee	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.60
Would accept nomination to be community leader	0.68	0.47	-0.01	0.75
Ethnicity: Acholi	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01
Ethnicity: Alur	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.37
Ethnicity: Bagwere	0.04	0.19	0.01	0.24
Ethnicity: Iteso	0.14	0.35	-0.02	0.20
Ethnicity: Karamojong	0.06	0.23	0.00	0.84
Ethnicity: Langi	0.44	0.50	0.00	0.74
Ethnicity: Lugbara	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.66
Ethnicity: Madi	0.08	0.26	0.01	0.58
Observations		1574		
p value on F-statistics on all covariates		0.045		

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the control mean and standard deviation, respectively. A small number of missing values are imputed at the median. Column (3) and (4) report the difference between control and treatment and corresponding p-value from ordinary least squares regressions of each baseline covariate on a treatment indicator, controlling for block fixed effects and clustering by group.

Table B.2: Correlates of attrition

Baseline covariate	Dependent variable: Indicator for attrition					
	2010 endline			2012 endline		
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Effect of 1 SD change in covariate	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Effect of 1 SD change in covariate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Assigned to treatment	0.020	[0.020]	.	-0.050	[0.023]	.
Grant amount applied for, USD	0.000	[0.000]	-0.030	0.000	[0.000]	0.000
Group size	0.000	[0.005]	0.003	-0.005	[0.004]	-0.034
Grant amount per member, USD	0.000	[0.000]	0.035	0.000	[0.000]	-0.010
Group existed before application	-0.016	[0.024]	.	-0.030	[0.025]	.
Group age, in years	0.001	[0.005]	0.002	-0.002	[0.006]	-0.003
Within-group heterogeneity (z-score)	0.013	[0.011]	0.013	0.026	[0.013]**	0.026
Quality of group dynamic (z-score)	0.008	[0.013]	0.008	-0.009	[0.016]	-0.009
Distance to educational facilities (km)	0.002	[0.002]	0.015	0.000	[0.003]	-0.002
Age at baseline	-0.003	[0.002]*	-0.018	-0.006	[0.002]***	-0.030
Large town/urban area	0.081	[0.030]***	.	0.143	[0.036]***	.
Risk aversion index (z-score)	0.039	[0.011]***	0.039	0.046	[0.012]**	0.046
Management committee member	-0.044	[0.018]**	.	-0.042	[0.024]	.
Chairperson or vice-chairperson	0.013	[0.027]	.	0.023	[0.036]	.
Weekly work hours: Casual labor	0.003	[0.002]*	0.017	0.003	[0.003]	0.013
Weekly work hours: Own business	0.001	[0.001]	0.005	-0.001	[0.002]	-0.010
Weekly work hours: Skilled trades	0.002	[0.001]*	0.018	0.000	[0.002]	0.004
Weekly work hours: High-skill wage labor	0.001	[0.009]	0.001	-0.017	[0.010]	-0.014
Weekly work hours: Other non-ag work	0.003	[0.003]	0.013	-0.002	[0.002]	-0.007
Weekly work hours: All agricultural work	-0.005	[0.001]***	-0.056	-0.005	[0.001]	-0.052
Weekly household chores, hours	-0.001	[0.000]	-0.012	-0.001	[0.001]	-0.017
Zero employment hours in past month	-0.134	[0.032]***	.	-0.149	[0.034]	.
Main occupation is non-agricultural	-0.171	[0.037]***	.	-0.094	[0.047]	.
Engaged in a skilled trade	-0.061	[0.036]*	.	-0.043	[0.053]	.
Currently in school	-0.083	[0.034]**	.	-0.067	[0.052]	.
Highest grade reached at school	-0.002	[0.003]	-0.007	0.000	[0.004]	0.000
Able to read and write minimally	0.065	[0.021]***	.	0.048	[0.026]	.
Received prior vocational training	-0.034	[0.030]	.	-0.051	[0.037]	.
Digit recall test score	-0.008	[0.004]**	-0.016	0.016	[0.006]***	0.033
Index of physical disability	-0.006	[0.002]***	-0.014	-0.002	[0.003]	-0.004
Durable assets (z-score)	0.016	[0.011]	0.017	-0.008	[0.012]	-0.009
Savings in past 6 mo. (000s 2008 UGX)	0.000	[0.000]	0.011	0.000	[0.000]***	0.035
Monthly cash earnings (000s 2008 UGX)	0.000	[0.000]*	-0.014	0.000	[0.000]	-0.017
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($58) loan	-0.024	[0.020]	.	-0.011	[0.022]	.
Can obtain 1,000,000 UGX ($580) loan	-0.014	[0.028]	.	0.005	[0.037]	.
Observations		2,232			2,111	
Mean of dependent variable		-0.146			-0.179	
p-value on F-test of joint significance, all covariates		<0.001			<0.001	

Notes: Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) report the coefficients and standard errors from a weighted least squares regression of an indicator for attrition on the baseline covariates used in all treatment effects regressions and listed in Table II (excluding the indicator for unfound at baseline). Weights are the inverse of the probability of selection into tracking. To provide a sense of magnitude, columns (3) and (6) report the product of the standard deviation of the baseline variable (in Table II) and the coefficients in Columns (1) and (4), with the exception of indicator variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.3: Sensitivity of baseline randomization balance to imputation of missing control group data

Baseline covariate exhibiting treatment imbalance (z-score)	Missing control group data imputed to the mean plus:	Balance statistics with imputed control group data							
		Control group			Treatment group			Regression difference	
		Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs	Coeff.	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Durable assets	+0.05 SD	-0.01	0.95	1,352	0.05	1.06	1,325	0.03	0.49
	+0.10 SD	0.02	0.97	1,352	0.05	1.06	1,325	0.01	0.90
	+0.15 SD	0.05	1.00	1,352	0.05	1.06	1,325	-0.02	0.69
	+0.20 SD	0.07	1.05	1,352	0.05	1.06	1,325	-0.05	0.39
	+0.25 SD	0.10	1.10	1,352	0.05	1.06	1,325	-0.08	0.20
Prior vocational training	+0.05 SD	0.02	0.97	1,352	0.02	1.04	1,325	0.04	0.39
	+0.10 SD	0.05	0.99	1,352	0.02	1.04	1,325	0.01	0.83
	+0.15 SD	0.08	1.02	1,352	0.02	1.04	1,325	-0.02	0.70
	+0.20 SD	0.11	1.07	1,352	0.02	1.04	1,325	-0.05	0.36
	+0.25 SD	0.13	1.12	1,352	0.02	1.04	1,325	-0.07	0.17
Can obtain 100,000 UGX loan	+0.05 SD	-0.02	0.96	1,352	0.09	1.02	1,325	0.09	0.03
	+0.10 SD	0.01	0.99	1,352	0.09	1.02	1,325	0.06	0.15
	+0.15 SD	0.04	1.02	1,352	0.09	1.02	1,325	0.03	0.45
	+0.20 SD	0.07	1.07	1,352	0.09	1.02	1,325	0.01	0.89
	+0.25 SD	0.09	1.12	1,352	0.09	1.02	1,325	-0.02	0.68
Savings in past 6 mo.	+0.05 SD	-0.02	0.82	1,352	0.06	1.16	1,325	0.06	0.11
	+0.10 SD	0.01	0.84	1,352	0.06	1.16	1,325	0.03	0.39
	+0.15 SD	0.03	0.88	1,352	0.06	1.16	1,325	0.01	0.87
	+0.20 SD	0.06	0.94	1,352	0.06	1.16	1,325	-0.02	0.65
	+0.25 SD	0.09	1.00	1,352	0.06	1.16	1,325	-0.05	0.33

Notes: This table recalculates balance for four baseline covariates displaying randomization imbalance at baseline, in Table B.1. Approximately 6% of control group observations are missing and a very small number of treatment group observations are missing (people who completed the survey but did not respond to a specific question). All covariates are standardized and missing treatment data are imputed to the mean, or zero. Missing control group data are imputed to the mean plus 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, or 0.25 SD of the variable, thus gradually increasing the values of the covariates in the control group. Columns (1) to (6) report summary statistics (mean, SD, and number of observations) for the imputed treatment and control group values. Columns (7) and (8) recalculate treatment-control mean differences using an ordinary least squares regression of the covariate on assignment to treatment and district (randomization strata) fixed effects. The standard error in Column (8) is robust and clustered by group.

Table B.5: Robustness to alternate specifications

Outcome variable	Alternate specification				
	Main specification	No controls, district FE	Plus demographics	Plus human/ physical capital	Randomization inference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Index of NRM/Presidential support	-0.041	-0.019	-0.019	-0.021	-0.041
	[.052]	[.054]	[.054]	[.053]	[.054]
Index of opposition support	0.117	0.121	0.111	0.112	0.117
	[.053]**	[.053]**	[.053]**	[.053]**	[.052]**
Index of general election political action	0.060	0.093	0.075	0.076	0.060
	[.053]	[.056]*	[.054]	[.053]	[.053]
District (randomization block) FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographics controls	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Human/physical capital controls	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Group and political controls	Y	N	N	N	Y
Group level of analysis	N	N	N	N	Y
Observations	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858

Notes: The table displays four alternate specifications to test the robustness of our results. Column (1) displays our main specification. Column (2) displays the results of a regression of the outcome measure on treatment and randomization block (district) fixed effects without any controls. Column (3) adds in demographic controls while column (4) adds in both demographic controls and human and physical capital controls. Column (5) is the same as our main specification but calculates effects at the group-level The overall summary indexes are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
$***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$,$*p < 0.10$

Table B.6: Robustness to alternate attrition scenarios

Outcome variable (z-score)	Main specification	Impute missing dependent variable with mean = +(-) X SD for missing control (treatment) respondents				"Worst case" Manski bound
		0.025 SD	0.05 SD	0.10 SD	0.25 SD	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Upper bound						
NRM/Presidential support	-0.041	-0.022	-0.014	0.001	0.046	0.507
	[.052]	[.046]	[.046]	[.046]	[.046]	[.064]***
Opposition support	0.117	0.096	0.103	0.118	0.163	0.673
	[.053]**	[.046]**	[.046]**	[.046]***	[.046]***	[.071]***
General political action	0.060	0.081	0.088	0.103	0.148	0.805
	[.053]	[.047]*	[.047]*	[.047]**	[.047]***	[.078]***
Panel B: Lower bound						
NRM/Presidential support	-0.041	-0.037	-0.044	-0.059	-0.104	-0.530
	[.052]	[.046]	[.046]	[.046]	[.046]**	[.061]***
Opposition support	0.117	0.081	0.074	0.059	0.014	-0.599
	[.053]**	[.046]*	[.046]	[.046]	[.046]	[.081]***
General political action	0.060	0.066	0.058	0.043	-0.002	-0.682
	[.053]	[.047]	[.047]	[.047]	[.047]	[.075]***
Observations	1858	2025	2025	2025	2025	2025

Notes: The table reports robustness to alternative attrition scenarios. We impute missing observations for the dependent variables. In columns 2 – 5, we impute missing dependent variables for the treatment group as the found treatment mean minus a multiple of the standard deviation of the treatment distribution. Similarly, we impute missing dependent variables for the control group as the found control mean plus a multiple of the standard deviation of the control distribution. In column 6 we apply Manski bounds, imputing the minimum value for unfound treated members and the maximum for unfound controls. Each regression controls for baseline covariates and district fixed effects. The overall summary indexes are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
$***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$,$*p < 0.10$

Table B.7: Robustness to attrition weights

Outcome variable	Alternate specification	
	Main specification	Using attrition weights
	(1)	(2)
Index of NRM/Presidential support	-0.041	-0.032
	[0.052]	[0.053]
Index of opposition support	0.117	0.117
	[0.053]**	[0.054]**
Index of general election political action	0.060	0.053
	[0.053]	[0.054]
Observations	1858	1858

Notes: The table displays our main specification and a version where we reweight for attrition using the leave-one-out method. The overall summary indexes are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
$***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$,$*p < 0.10$

Table B.8: Impacts by age

	DV: Opposition support		
	Effect for those 20 or under in 2008	Effect for those over 20 in 2008	Entire sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Assigned to treatment	0.065	0.150	0.142
	[0.089]	[0.064]**	[0.064]**
Age 20 or under			-0.073
			[0.072]
Assigned x age 20 or under			-0.109
			[0.108]
Observations	371	1,487	1858

Notes: The table reports treatment effects on opposition by age as a proxy for first time voting. In column 1, we limit the sample to individuals aged 20 or under (or those who were not eligible to vote in the previous election). In column 2, we limit the sample to individuals above the age of 20 (or those eligible to vote in the previous election). In column 3, we use the entire sample and include a dummy for being below 20 and an interaction between treatment and the dummy.
$***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$,$*p < 0.10$

Table B.9: Heterogeneity by fair and random

	DV: Opposition support			
	Thought selection was		Thought selection was	
	fair	not fair	random	not random
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Assigned to treatment	0.140	0.124	0.158	0.126
	[0.067]**	[0.113]	[0.144]	[0.058]**
Observations	1,160	696	234	1,624
R-squared	0.098	0.143	0.311	0.086

Notes: This table displays ITT results by individual's perceptions of selections. In columns 1 and 2 we show the treatment effect on individuals who thought selection was fair or not. In columns 3 and 4, we limit the sample to individuals who thought selection was random/not random.

Table B.10: Mediation analysis

	Y: Opposition support; T: Treatment; M: Mediator						
	Reg. of M on T		Reg. of Y on T and M		Reg. of Y on T		
	Coeff. on T		Coeff. on M		Coeff. on T		Percent
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	mediated
Mediator M	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Income, z-score	0.24	[.053]***	0.11	[.031]***	0.12	[.054]**	0.23
Index of 2011 election intimidation, z-score	0.03	[.051]	0.12	[.032]***	0.12	[.054]**	0.03
Existence of a patron, z-score	0.14	[.051]***	-0.02	[.025]	0.12	[.054]**	0.02
Kin relations, z-score	0.05	[.048]	-0.05	[.026]*	0.12	[.054]**	0.02
Community participation, z-score	0.01	[.053]	-0.01	[.026]	0.12	[.054]**	0.00
Public goods contributions, z-score	0.02	[.050]	-0.02	[.029]	0.12	[.054]**	0.00
Antisocial behaviors, z-score	0.01	[.050]	0.10	[.033]***	0.12	[.054]**	0.01
Protest attitudes and participation, z-score	-0.02	[.044]	0.34	[.034]***	0.12	[.054]**	0.05
Migrated	-0.04	[.036]	0.15	[.081]*	0.12	[.054]**	0.05
Group cooperation, z-score	-0.21	[.133]	-0.02	[.012]**	0.12	[.054]**	0.04

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) represent regressions of each mediator on treatment. Columns (3) and (4) display regressions of opposition support on treatment and the mediator, Columns (5) and (6) display regressions of opposition support on treatment. Column (7) displays the percent of the effect of opposition support mediated by the variables listed. This is calculated as the coefficient in (1) times the coefficient in (2) divided by the coefficient of (3). Standard errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.We calculate the ITT via a weighted least squares regression of the dependent variable on a program assignment indicator, 13 district (randomization stratum) fixed effects, and a vector of control variables that includes all of the baseline covariates reported in Appendix B.1.

Table B.11: Program impacts on other outcomes

	Full sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Control	ITT, with controls		
Dependent variable in 2012	Mean	Mean	SD	N
Elections were free and fair (0-3)	2.125	-0.052	[.045]	1817
Thinks it is likely that powerful people can find out how they voted	1.570	0.024	[.054]	1776
Thinks tax officials are corrupt (0-3)	1.547	-0.020	[.043]	1572
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes	2.439	-0.037	[.048]	1782
Enumerator sent by the government	0.408	0.006	[.024]	1755
Enumerator sent by the International org	0.324	0.017	[.023]	1755
Enumerator sent by others	0.268	-0.023	[.022]	1755
Knows the name of LC3 and LC5 (0-1)	0.734	0.016	[.022]	2022

Notes: This table displays ITT impacts on outcomes not displayed in the main tables. We regress each outcome on treatment assignment, baseline covariates and block (district) fixed effects. We weight observations by the inverse of the probability of selection into tracking.